The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this contribution we define the balanced solution which assigns weights to players such that the corresponding weighted Shapley value of each player is equal to her weight. We prove its existence for all monotone transferable utility games, discuss other properties of this solution, and deal with its characterization through a reduced game consistency.
Introduction
Consider a finite set N with n players. Situations where each subset of players of N can generate a certain worth can be described by a cooperative transferable utility game (or simply TU-game) (N, v) : for any coalition S ⊆ N , the real number v(S) is the worth of S, which the members of the coalition S can distribute among themselves. A payoff vector in an n-player TU-game is an n-dimensional vector whose components are the payoffs of the corresponding players. A single-valued solution for a class C of TU-games is a function that assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game in C. The best known single-valued solution for TU-games is the Shapley value, Shapley (1953b) , which distributes the so-called Harsanyi dividends of the game equally among the players in the corresponding coalitions (see Section 2 for undefined notions).
The equal distribution of the dividends seems questionable in situations that suggest proportionality rather than equality. A prominent example is the sociopsychological equity theory of Homans (1961) and Selten (1978) . The standard business practice of dividing a firm's profit proportionally to investment (constant return per share) could serve as a daily-life example of the same phenomenon. (Subadditive) cost games provide another example. Consider a market with non-linear pricing where the unit price depends on the purchased volume, e.g., it equals to 10 for quantities bellow five and 8 for higher amounts. Suppose there are two agents in the market who have to buy two and three units, respectively. One might expect that the buyers will agree to pool their resources and buy together the five units to guarantee the lower price for both of them, spending 16 and 24 units, respectively.
On the contrary, all prominent solutions for TU-games (Shapley value, nucleolus etc.) are based on equal split of the dividends for 2-person games. In this example these solutions predict that buyers split the cost savings (of 10) equally (spending 15 and 25 respectively, and facing different prices of 15/2 and 25/3). the solution proposed by Vorob'ev and Liapounov (1998) . Their approach is based on the weighted Shapley value, Shapley (1953a) , where the dividends are distributed among players proportionally according to some exogenously given weights. The proper Shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition N among the players in such a way that the payoff vector x coincides with the weighted Shapley value with respect to the weight scheme given by that vector x. Thus the proper Shapley value is obtained as a fixed point of the mapping that appears in the definition of the weighted Shapley value.
Vorob 'ev and Liapounov (1998) proved the existence of the proper Shapley value for all games with nonnegative dividends. These games form a proper subclass of monotone, convex games. Similarly to their approach, we consider fixed points of a particular mapping on the payoff simplex. Our mapping coincides with that of Vorob'ev and Liapounov for positive efficient weights; for weights on the boundary of the nonnegative efficient simplex we follow the original Shapley value approach and split the dividends equally among the players in the corresponding coalition.
A payoff vector obtained in this way will be called a balanced value. The balanced solution assigns to each game the set of all balanced values. The idea behind the proper Shapley value and our solution is identical: since the payoff vector given by the weighted Shapley value and the vector of weights itself express the power of the players in the game, they should naturally coincide.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present some basic facts about TU-games and their solutions. The balanced value and the balanced solution are introduced in Section 3. We discuss some basic properties and state the theorem saying that each monotone game admits at least one balanced value. We also deal with a characterization of the balanced solution adapting the reduced game property used by Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) to axiomatize the Shapley value. Finally, the proofs of the main results are presented in Section 4.
Preliminaries
Let us start with several formal definitions. A transferable utility game (TU-game for short) is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n} and v is a characteristic function assigning to each subset S ⊆ N a real number v(S) whereas v(∅) = 0. We denote the collection of all TU-games by G. Harsanyi, 1959) . Let us note that v(S) = T ⊆S ∆ N,v (T ) for every S ⊆ N . This formula shows that the dividends uniquely determine the characteristic function.
We employ the following notation. Let N be a finite nonempty set, y ∈ R N , and S ⊆ N . The symbol y| S stands for the restriction of y to S and y S stands for i∈S y i whereas y ∅ = 0. 
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a ) of a game (N, v) is an efficient single-valued solution obtained by distributing the dividends of every coalition equally among all players in the coalition, i.e., it is the function ϕ :
where |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
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Given a weight vector ω ∈ R N with weights ω i > 0, i ∈ N , the corresponding weighted Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b ) is the function ϕ 
The best known set-valued solution is the core which assigns to every game the set of efficient payoff vectors that are group stable in the sense that every coalition gets at least its own worth. So, the core of a game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors given by
A problem with the core is that it can be empty, even for monotone superadditive games.
Let us recall several notions which will be helpful later.
for all S ⊆ N (see, e.g., Aumann and Drèze, 1980, Chang and Kan, 1994) .
• Players i, j ∈ N are symmetric with respect to (N, v) 
In the next definition we recall some notions related to solutions of TU-games.
Definition 2. Let C ⊆ G be a class of games and F be a solution defined on v) , and every com-
• the component restriction property if, for every (N, v) ∈ C, every component C in (N, v) , and every x, x ∈ F (N, v), we have that x given by
• the null player property if, for every (N, v) ∈ C and x ∈ F (N, v), we have x i = 0 whenever i is a null player in the game (N, v);
• the symmetry property if, for every (N, v) ∈ C and x ∈ F (N, v), we have x i = x j whenever i and j are symmetric players with respect to (N, v); Let us be more formal.
For the sake of brevity, we omit the parameters (N, v) if no confusion is possible.
The mapping h coincides with the mapping ω → ϕ 
This means that h maps values from X to X.
The next definition introduces the key notion of our paper.
We denote 
Thus in this case the worth of the grand coalition is distributed proportionally to the individual worths.
(iii) In general, fixed points for h : X → X need not exist, as one can easily check in the case of the following two-player game:
However, we have the following first main result. 
Theorem 2. If (N, v) is a monotone superadditive game and x is a balanced value
The proof of this theorem can also be found in Section 4. The next proposition captures properties of balanced values related to the symmetry property and the null player property. 
It is well known that efficiency, the symmetry property, the null player property, and additivity uniquely determine the Shapley value. Let us remark that the bal- 
Note that Proposition 1(i) implies that there exists a balanced value with x 1 = x 2 .
Further, Proposition 1(ii) implies that for players i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a balanced value with x i = 0. Since v({1, 2}) > 0 there cannot be a balanced value with x 1 = x 2 = 0. Therefore we can conclude that there are at least three balanced values.
It can be verified that (0, 3/2, 3/2), (3/2, 0, 3/2), and
are the balanced values for (N, v), while the core consists of the single point (1, 1, 1) .
However, for any monotone simple game (N, v), every core allocation is a balanced
Denote the class of all games with at least one balanced value by G B . We provide a characterization of the balanced solution among solutions defined on G B . We adapt the HM-reduced game property that characterizes the Shapley value in Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) . The HM-reduced game property considers situations in which some players 'leave' the game. This property states that the payoffs of players that do not leave the game do not change if we consider an appropriately defined reduced game on the set of players remaining in the game. In this reduced game the worth of each coalition equals the worth of the union of this coalition and all players that leave the game minus the payoffs of the leaving players in the corresponding restricted game. The formal description is the following.
Let (N, v) ∈ G, f be a solution on the class G, and T ⊆ N . The Hart and
where T c = N \ T is the coalition of leaving players and v S∪T c is the restricted game To characterize the balanced solution we use a different reduced game which we refer to as the proportional reduced game. In this reduced game that results after some players have left the game, the dividend of a coalition S of the remaining players is equal to the dividend of coalition S in the original game plus a share in the original dividends of all coalitions containing S and players who left the game. 
Definition 5. We say that a solution F satisfies the proportional reduced game property on a class C ⊆ G if, for every (N, v) ∈ C, x ∈ F (N, v), and nonempty
Remark 3. The formula for ∆ T,v x T (S) can also be written as follows
Similarly to the HM-reduced game property, the proportional reduced game property can be seen as a consistency property. The just defined notions provide a 'partial axiomatization' of the balanced solution whose proof is contained in Section 4. (ii) If an efficient solution F on G B satisfies the proportional reduced game prop-
Now we introduce the converse proportional reduced game property to obtain a characterization of the balanced solution. Let S ⊆ N and x ∈ R N be a nonnegative vector (i.e., all coordinates of x are nonnegative) with x S > 0. We set
We establish properties of h i , k S , and q S needed in the sequel. In the proofs we will abbreviate notation ∆ N,v (T ) to ∆(T ) in case there is no confusion about the game we consider.
Lemma 1. Let (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N . Then
Proof. It is known that the dividends can be expressed as
We can write Proof. We start with the following claim. We are going to prove the assertion for S ⊆ N with |S| = k and nonnegative
Define an auxiliary function ψ by
We have
We compute the first derivative of ψ
Set P := S ∪ {i}. Using the induction hypothesis, we obtain
Here we have used the fact that the function −g = (−1)
is positive and satisfies the required conditions on signs of its derivatives. Using (2) (i) The mapping h is continuous on X + .
(ii) We have h(x) ∈ X 0 for all x ∈ X + .
Proof. The statement (i) is obvious. As for (ii), recall that h(x) ∈ X for every x ∈ X by Remark 1. Using monotonicity of the game (N, v) , Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we see that h i (x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ X + and i ∈ N . Thus we have h(x) ∈ X 0 for x ∈ X + . Now we define the mapping H :
Proof. (ii) Fix x ∈ X 0 . Since X 0 is compact, we have H(x) ⊆ X 0 by Lemma 3(ii). Using (i) and compactness of X 0 , we get that H(x) is compact. To prove that
contained in the compact set X 0 . Therefore, there exists a convergent subsequence
This follows from continuity of h on X + . Now let us define a mapping F from X 0 to the set of all convex subsets of X 0 such that F (x) is the convex envelope of H(x) for every x ∈ X 0 .
Lemma 5.
(i) The set F (x) is a nonempty convex compact subset of X 0 for all
Proof. (i) This assertion immediately follows from Lemma 4(ii), convexity of X 0 , and the well-known fact that the convex envelope of any compact subset of R n is compact.
(ii) This part clearly follows from Lemma 4(iii).
(iii) Take Kakutani's theorem (see Kakutani, 1941 , or, e.g., Franklin, 1980 states that any multivalued F from a nonempty compact convex subset D of R n to itself such that the graph of F is closed and F (x) is convex, closed, and nonempty for all x ∈ D, has a fixed point, i.e., there exists an
Since we have shown that F and its domain X 0 satisfy the assumptions of Kakutani's theorem, we have the following lemma.
The next lemma shows the relationships between fixed points of h and F .
Proof. We distinguish two cases.
)} (Lemma 5(ii)) and, consequently, 
. . , p, the equation (4) guarantees that z j i = 0 for every i ∈ Q, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Let us simplify the notation by setting z := z By monotonicity of (N, v) we get v(S) = 0 for every S ⊆ Q. Consequently, Proof. Denote Q = {i ∈ N | x i = 0} and for ε > 0 we set
If ε > 0 is sufficiently small, then y ε ∈ X + and we have
Now it is easy to see that h(y
and we are done.
Now we prove Theorem 2. By Theorem 1, the set B(N, v) is nonempty. Using
Lemma 1 and superadditivity of (N, v), we get for x ∈ X 0 with x i > 0 the following estimates.
(5)
The term S⊆N i∈S k S (x) can be rewritten as follows
Further, we compute S⊆T,i∈S
Thus we get
The inequality (5) and the identity (6) (ii) The idea of this proof is the same as in the previous part. Set R = {x ∈ X 0 | x i = 0}. The set R is nonempty, compact, and convex. Let F again be the mapping defined in subsection 4.1. We define a multivalued mapping G by G(x) = F (x) ∩ R, x ∈ R. It is clear that G(x) is a compact convex set for every x ∈ R and the set
We also show that G(x) is nonempty whenever x ∈ R. To this end, fix x ∈ R.
Since v(N ) > 0, one can find j ∈ N with x j > 0. We define y ε ∈ X by 
For S ⊆ N with 1 ∈ S and x ∈ X 0 with x S > 0 we have
If 2 ∈ S then the last term is 0, otherwise it is negative by Lemma 2. Since
1 > 0, we thus get g ≤ 0 on (0, 1). But we know also that
and this yields g < 0 on (0, 1). This is in contradiction with g(0) = g(1) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We start with the following claim.
Proof. Firts of all, we prove that if S ⊆ N intersects both C and N \ C, then ∆(S) = 0 . If S contains just two elements, then the observation follows directly from the definition of component. Now take a set S with the required property and assume that the observation holds for all sets having less elements than S. Using this assumption and the definition of component we have
Then the assertion of Claim 2 follows immediately from the observation that
We will continue with the proof of Proposition 2. To prove component efficiency consider (N, v) ∈ G with a component C and x ∈ B (N, v) . Using Claim 2 we get
The last equality follows from Remark 1.
Now consider x, x ∈ B(N, v) and a vector x defined by
We show that x ∈ B (N, v) . According to component efficiency we have
Now it is clear that x ∈ X 0 (N, v). Using Claim 2, for i ∈ C, we have
The equality x i = h i (x ) for i ∈ N \C immediately follows since N \C is a component of (N, v) as well.
The null player property of the balanced solution follows from component efficiency since C := {i}, where i is a null player in (N, v) , is a component in (N, v) . The last equality holds since we added just the zero dividends. Since the last sum equals v(N ) = 1, we have h i (x) = x i and we are done.
Summing up (8) and (9) provides the desired equality.
Now we can start with the proof of Proposition 3.
(i) The desired assertion follows easily from Lemma 9.
(ii) We will proceed by induction on the cardinality of N . If The converse proportional reduced game property of F implies that x ∈ F (N, v) and the proof is finished.
